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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
body of water as a river or stream in these situations? These
questions are truly confusing if we simply rely on the test set
forth in Amerada and Esso.
The geological characteristics which the court considered in
Cockrell could be the answer to these complex problems. Instead
of the flat statement that a body of water is a river or stream if
it has the power to carry and deposit alluvion, this decision
makes possible the use of expert testimony and physical evi-
dence. It is submitted that the law regarding alluvion and the
difficulty of characterizing a body of water as a river or stream
will be greatly simplified should the Supreme Court accept the
geological characteristics dealt with in Cockrell.
Kenneth E. Gordon, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION - STATE
REGULATION OF LEGAL PROFESSION
The Virginia State Bar sued under state legislation to enjoin
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and others from engag-
ing in a legal aid program alleged to constitute unauthorized
practice of law and solicitation of legal business.' Under the
program, the United States was divided into sixteen regions and
a local lawyer or firm was selected by the Brotherhood in each
region as the most competent counsel to settle personal injury
suits of union members. When a worker was injured or killed,
the secretary of his local lodge would visit him or his family and
urge that the claim not be settled without prior legal advice, and
that in the Brotherhood's judgment the best lawyer to consult
was the regional counsel recommended by it.2 The result of the
plan was to channel substantially all of the personal injury cases
1. Suit was instituted pursuant to 2 VA. CODE 619 (1950); 171 Va. xviii
(1938), wherein the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals virtually promulgated
the American Bar Association's Canons of Ethics into official Rules of Court in
accordance with the authority granted by statute. See VA. CODE §§ 54-42-54.83.1
(1950).
2. A great deal of uncertainty surrounds the actual relationships of attorney,
client, and union in the principal case. In the past, the union official who con-
tacted the injured had received a substantial gratuity from the lawyer involved;
it also appears that the attorney paid for free trips offered to the injured, that
he might consult with the attorney in question before signing a contract. Often
the injured was shown a photostatic copy of checks previously recovered. See
In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
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of the Brotherhood members to counsel recommended by the
union. The Virginia State Bar sued in the Chancery Court of
Richmond, an injunction was issued as prayed for,3 and the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed summarily. On certio-
rari, two Justices dissenting, the United States Supreme Court
reversed. Held, a state's prohibition of a union's recommenda-
tion of particular attorneys to its members as the most compe-
tent counsel to litigate their personal injury claims guaranteed
by federal statute constitutes an infringement of the union mem-
bers' right to freedom of association, and cannot be justified as
a legitimate exercise of the state's power to regulate the legal
profession. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 84
Sup. Ct. 1113 (1964).
The right of association is a new and rapidly developing con-
cept in constitutional law. On its face, the first amendment
creates no protected right of association per se; the Supreme
Court, beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama4 and De Jonge v.
Oregon," has developed the present freedom of association by im-
plication from the explicit freedoms of assembly and speech. In
the former case, union picketing was held an aspect of freedom
of speech; in the latter, it was held that assembly for political
discussion could not be deemed unlawful per se without some
further showing of illegality. Although the protection extended
in De Jonge was apparently based on freedom of assembly, the
Court indicated that it was unwilling to separate the idea of
freedom of assembly from that of speech." Subsequent cases in-
The majority in the principal case does not elaborate on the circumstances sur-
rounding the present action, but the dissent indicated that the president of the
union exerted considerable influence on the case and on the fees of participating
attorneys. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1118. Moreover, there seems to be some conflict as to
the facts of the principal case as viewed by the majority and the dissent. The ma-
jority state that the union now provides a staff at its own expense to investi-
gate the accidents, whereas the dissenting opinion clearly intimates that there is
some sort of reimbursement for these services paid for by the regional counsel.
See 84 Sup. Ct. at 1115, n.8, and id. at 1118. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that
the question of "fee-splitting" is explicitly held to be an issue unnecessary to a
decision in the case. Id. at 1116, n.9. Therefore, presumably the portion of the
injunction against fee-splitting still stands. See note 3 infra.
3. The pertinent part of the injunction sought by Virginia reads as follows:
"[Firom holding out lawyers selected by it [union] as the only approved lawyers
to aid the members or their families; . ..or in any other manner soliciting or
encouraging such legal employment of the selected lawyers; .. .or from doing
any act or combination of acts, and from formulating and putting into practice
any plan, pattern or design, the result of which is to channel legal employment
to any particular lawyer or group of lawyers .. 1.." 84 Sup. Ct. at 1115-16.
4. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
5. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
6. Id. at 365: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable as-
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dicate the Court's growing concern with the relationship be-
tween the two freedoms. Thus, in Wieman v. Updegraff,7 a state
act requiring a loyalty oath of state employees was held to vio-
late the first amendment because, under the act, association with
an organization alone determined disloyalty and consequently
there was a stifling of "democratic expression and controversy.",,
By the time of Sweezy v. New Hampshire9 in 1957, freedom of
association as an independent right was becoming more explicit,
though still related to freedom of speech: "every citizen shall
have the right to engage in political expression and association.
This right was enshrined in the First Amendment." 10 (Emphasis
added.) Finally, in NAACP v. Alabama," Justice Harlan, speak-
ing for the majority, announced: "It is beyond debate that free-
dom to engage in associations for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the
due process clause."'12
Harlan's expression in NAACP v. Alabama left uncertainty
whether the activities protected by freedom of association were
limited to those intimately related to the expression of political
ideas, as implied in Wieman and Sweezy. 18 The subsequent rea-
soning in NAACP v. Button 4 indicated an affirmative answer.
This case sustained the NAACP practice of hiring lawyers to
sembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Consti-
tition protects."
7. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
8. Id. at 191.
9. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
10. Id. at 250.
11. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
12. Id. at 460.
13. This implication is drawn from the Wieman and Sweezy quotations ap-
pearing in the text. Whether the expressions appearing in the Wieman and
Sweezy cases are indicative of an intention on the court's part to protect only
political expressions is admittedly debatable. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
court did intend to protect association for the advancement of beliefs, political or
otherwise. In Alabama, Justice Harlan indicated in dictum that it was imma-
terial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, or cultural matters, that the state action must, in any case, be subject
to the closest scrutiny. Id. at 460-61. This dictum must be read in the light of
Harlan's subsequent dissent in both the Button and Brotherhood cases, particu-
larly the latter, wherein he places great emphasis on the presence or absence of
political motives within the organizations involved. Furthermore, whether Har-
lan's dictum in Alabama was good law is largely a moot question with regard to
the instant case, since his statement was clearly limited to the protection of the
expression of beliefs (whether political or otherwise), whereas the instant case is
concerned with the protection and effective enforcement of private property rights.
See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
14. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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handle its members' civil rights suits as an activity protected
by the freedom of association. The Court emphasized that the
litigation involved was not a method of resolving private differ-
ences, 15 but was rather a form of political expression. The state's
regulation of these political expressions was held too broad, the
state failing to show an interest sufficient to outweigh the polit-
ical interests of the NAACP.
It is fundamental that the first and fourteenth amendment
freedoms are not absolute. Their exercise may be subject to rea-
sonable state regulation pursuant to a legitimate legislative
goal.16 The current test of such a regulation's validity is whether
the interest of the state in avoiding a substantive evil is suffi-
cient to overbalance the limitation sought to be placed on the
exercise of the freedom in question. Further, such a regulation
should be drawn as narrowly as possible.'7
A state's power to regulate professional conduct in general
has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
and exercised freely by the states.' Pursuant to this authority,
twenty-six states have incorporated the American Bar Associa-
tion's Canons of Ethics into state law. 19 Of prime significance
are the canons aimed at curbing solicitation of legal business
and protecting the attorney-client relationship. It is thus pro
vided that no lawyer should, directly or indirectly, seek out those
with personal injury claims, or remunerate those who bring or
15. Id. at 429: "In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a tech-
nique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful ob-
jectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for
the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of polit-
ical expression."
16. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) ; Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
17. E.g., Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The now classic "weighing and balancing test" had
its origin in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. at 510: "Chief Judge Learned Hand, writ-
ing for the majority below, [said:] 'In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion [of
rights] as is necessary to avoid the danger.' We adopt this statement of the rule."
The requirement for the statute to be drawn as narrowly as possible is exempli-
fied by the Shelton case, 364 U.S. at 488: "[E]ven though the governmental pur-
pose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end may be more narrowly
achieved."
18. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; Semler v. Oregon,
294 U.S. 608 (1935) ; State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 165 At. 601 (1933) ;
People v. Witte, 315 111. 282, 146 N.E. 178 (1924) ; State v. DeVerges, 153 La.
349, 95 So. 805 (1923).
19. RIcE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 96, n.155 (1962).
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influence the bringing of such cases to his office ;20 that no lay
intermediary should be permitted to intervene between lawyer
and client, and that employment by an organization "should not
include the rendering of legal services to members of such an
organization in respect to their individual affairs" ;21 and, that
no lawyer should permit his name or services to be used by a lay
agency for the purpose of aiding or making possible the un-
authorized practice of law.2 2 In addition to the canons, state
case law leaves little doubt that the states believed their legiti-
mate power included the power to restrain solicitation, 23 even if
the defendant raised a constitutional objection, such as denial of
due process, 24 or of equal protection of the law.
25
In federal courts, similar conclusions were reached. Thus,
the Supreme Court has sustained a state's prohibition of solici-
tation over a claimed denial of due process of law, stating that
"a regulation which aims to bring the conduct of the business
into harmony with ethical practice is obviously reasonable."2
Similarly, the Supreme Court on two other occasions has upheld
a state's power to regulate solicitation and advertisement in
other professions over constitutional objections. 27 Within this
context, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen had been en-
joined from fee-splitting practices accompanying recommenda-
tion of attorneys by at least one lower federal court 28 and three
separate state courts. 29 None of these cases, however, indicate
that the Brotherhood raised a constitutional issue.
In the instant case, the majority opinion held that the activi-
20. ABA CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 28.
21. Id. Canon 35.
22. Id. Canon 47.
23. See Higgins v. State Bar, 46 Cal. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 455 (1956) ; Hilde-
brand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 255 P.2d 508 (1950) ; People v. Motorist's
Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E. 827 (1943) ; People v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Iil.
50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935) ; Ryan v. Penn R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932) ; Kelley v.
Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316 (1927) ; In re Fisch, 269 App. Div. 74, 54
N.Y.S.2d 126 (1945) ; In re Shiffman, 269 App. Div. 76, 54 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1945) ;
Petition of Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1933) ; Goodman v. Motor-
ist's Alliance, 29 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 31 (1931) ; State ex rel. McIntosh v. Rossman,
53 Wash. 1, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821 (1909).
24. Em parte McCloskey, 82 Tex. Crim. 531, 199 S.W. 1101 (1918).
25. Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316 (1927).
26. McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107, 108 (1920).
27. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; Semler v. Oregon, 294
U.S. 608 (1935).
28. In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
29. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); In re
Brotherhood, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1959) ; Petition of Bar Ass'n, 15
Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1935).
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ties of the Brotherhood, which were designed to aid its members
in asserting their rights guaranteed by federal statutes, were
protected by freedom of association, the state having failed to
show interest sufficient to justify enjoining the plan of recom-
mendation of attorneys to the members.30 In effect, the decision
extended the ambit of the right of association, while evidently
discounting to some extent the state's traditional interest in reg-
ulation of the legal profession. In reaching its conclusion, the
majority relies heavily on NAACP v. Button,31 but evidently
broadens the scope of freedom of association as there defined.
As has been indicated, Button unquestionably extended the scope
of the protection of freedom of association to political organiza-
tions propounding political ideas ;32 but it is equally clear that
the majority opinion in that case is not authority for extending
freedom of association to all organizations indiscriminately.3 8
In the instant case, it appears that the Brotherhood could not be
deemed to have a political interest in its members' personal lia-
bility claims, even though these claims were guaranteed by the
Federal Employer's Liability Act 84 and the Safety Appliance
Act.8 5 The claims asserted in the instant case rest on the in-
dividual property interests of the members rather than on any
collective political interest of the group.3 6 Thus it is perhaps
significant that the majority does not argue that the Brother-
hood is protected in its actions because of its political nature.
Indeed, the scope of the freedom announced in Brotherhood may
go beyond protecting organizations advancing claims guaranteed
by federal statute, although the decision indicates, with some
uncertainty, that the Federal Employer's Liability Act and the
Safety Appliance Act may be determinative.37
The majority opinion in the principal case does not include
30. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1117-18.
31. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1117.
32. See note 14 supra.
33. See note 14 supra.
34. 34 Stat. 232 (1906), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
35. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1952).
36. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1115.
37. Id. at 1117: "A state could not . . . infringe in any way the right of in-
dividuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Con-
gress." In a long series of state cases, it had been repeatedly held that automo-
bile associations would not be permitted to engage attorneys and hold them out
as the approved and recommended lawyers for handling the accident cases of the
association's members. See note 23 supra. Since no federal statute is there in-
volved, it would have been extremely helpful to an interpretation of the instant
case if the court had mentioned what bearing, if any, the instant decision might
have on the automobile cases.
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any serious evaluation of the interest which the state has con-
ventionally urged in defending statutes designed to curb solici-
tation.38 In the past, the state's interest in controlling the solici-
tation of legal business was felt to have several aspects. The
relationship of attorney and client was to be free of interme-
diaries whose interests might vary from those of the client;
there was fear that third parties who obtained a financial inter-
est in a case might exert pressures contrary to the best interest
of the client; no relationship should be struck between an attor-
ney and a third party which might lessen the degree of confi-
dence placed in him by his client and by the public generally; no
third party should be permitted to institute or encourage litiga-
tion which might, otherwise, find settlement out of court; and
finally, there was the general fear that the legal profession
might be reduced to a commercial enterprise.3 9 Under the nar-
rowest construction possible, the majority in the instant case
holds that the state has no interest sufficient to justify an in-
junction which would, by its terms, prohibit the recommenda-
tion of particular attorneys to its members even though its effect
is to channel personal injury cases to recommended counsel.40
The court seems to dismiss the possibility that such a state in-
terest might prevail with the proposition that a state cannot
foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels, 41
and that mere recommendation does not constitute solicitation.4 2
The Court further concludes that the state was not trying to
prevent commercialization of the legal profession. 43 The opinion
does not consider the interest which the state might have in pre-
venting a recommended attorney or firm from monopolizing this
particular type of FELA litigation, especially when there is no
guarantee that the counsel involved is more competent than one
who might be selected, without union encouragement, by the in-
jured himself. Moreover, the history of the Brotherhood's plan
seems to indicate that where the plan was in operation, the at-
torneys were often obliged to split their fees with the union ;44
38. See 84 Sup. Ct. at 1117, and text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
39. See Comment, 25 U. CHT. L. REV. 674 (1958) (many eases cited) ; Note,
7 VAND. L. REv. 677 (1954) ; but 8ee Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (1958).
40. 84 Sup. Ct. at 1117-18.
41. Id. at 1117.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. See, e.g., In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 394,
150 N.E.2d 163, 166 (1958). Apparently, there was evidence of fee splitting in
the union's Virginia operations out of which the present litigation arose, since
the state court injunction was directed against fee splitting as well as recom-
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and, it further appears that the union exerted control over the
attorney-client relationship and the conduct of the litigation
which affected the disposition of the cases. 45 Thus, the state
might well have been attempting to curb what it thought was the
basic problem: a program in which the incentive to split fees
and the likelihood of interference with the attorney-client rela-
tionship were great, and the practical possibility of checking
these evils without attacking the entire program was severely
limited.46 In the light of these considerations, the Court's denial
of any substantial state interest seems at least questionable.
The majority's ambiguous extension of the scope of freedom
of association, coupled with its lack of consideration of the
state's interest in prohibiting solicitation of legal business by an
organization, poses a serious threat to the dignity of the legal
profession and the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.
Even if the court's holding is limited to situations where the
object of litigation is enforcement of a cause of action provided
by federal law, its ramifications could be extensive. Numerous
other federal statutes47 beside the FELA and Safety Appliance
Act provide causes of action for personal and property damages
to various classes of prospective litigants, who under some form
of organization might enable a favored attorney or firm to
escape the restrictions against solicitation in the legal profes-
sion. If, on the other hand, the instant case forecasts extension
of freedom of association to an extent which would materially
hamper the state's ability to prevent solicitation of legal busi-
ness whenever it is carried on by an organization for the benefit
of its members, the traditional protection of the legal profes-
sion and the attorney-client relationship from commercial inter-
ests and pressures might become largely a thing of the past.
Marshall B. Brinkley
mendation. See 84 Sup. Ct. at 1115, n.9, 1118. However, as the majority viewed
the case this aspect of the injunction was not at issue. See note 2 supra.
45. See 84 Sup. Ct. at 1118; In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.
2d 391, 394, 150 N.E.2d 163, 166 (1958).
46. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) : "Chief Judge
Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as follows:
'In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.' We adopt this statement of the rule."
47. E.g., Jones Act, 41 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) ; Longshore-
men and Harbor Workers Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1952);
Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195 (1953) ; Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) ; 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1953) ; Federal Torts Claims
Act, 60 Stat. 843, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1946).
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